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This paper analyses the determinants of wage differentials between five categories of enterprises 
(state-owned enterprises at central or provincial level, local publicly-owned enterprises, urban 
collective enterprises, private or individual enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises), in urban 
China in 1995. We find higher wages in state-owned enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises 
compared to collective and domestic private enterprises, but no significant difference in hourly 
wages between state-owned enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises in 1995. Indeed, 
although foreign-invested enterprises allow for higher global annual income, it is at the cost of 
longer working hours. Moreover, we find strong evidence for segmentation on the Chinese 
labour market in 1995, segmentation being the major determinant of observed differences in 
average wages between enterprises’ types. In particular, we find a strong segmentation in favour 
of state-owned enterprises at central or provincial level against foreign-invested enterprises, 
average wages in foreign-invested enterprises meeting those in state-owned enterprises only 
because workers in foreign-invested enterprises have on average better socio-economic 
characteristics and in particular a higher education attainment. 
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1 The authors are grateful to Li Shi for providing access to the household income survey data used in the paper.  3
Introduction 
 
State-owned enterprises reforms and the implied changes on the China’s labour market 
are one of the key elements in the process of China’s transition toward a market economy, as well 
as a main challenge for coming reforms in order to maintain Chinese economic growth. Rather 
than privatising state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the beginning of the reform process, the 
Chinese government decided to gradually reform the state sector, while encouraging the 
emergence of a concurrent non-state sector. Employment structure has thus been diversified 
thanks to the development of a dynamic non-state sector composed of collective enterprises, 
private and individual enterprises and foreign enterprises. Meanwhile, in spite of reforms 
gradually carried out, SOEs’ performance kept deteriorating, leading to massive layoffs in recent 
years.  
The evolution of the state and non-state sectors has had important implications on 
changes in both employment and labour income structures, which are key factors of the widening 
of income disparity observed during the past two decades. The enterprise ownership 
diversification led to increasing wage heterogeneity with different types of enterprises facing 
different market conditions.  
This paper intends to study and analyse the determinants of wage differentials between 
the different types of enterprises in 1995.  As pointed out by Zhao (2001), wage differentials 
between SOEs and private enterprises are one of the major forces, which should drive labour 
reallocation in China. Moreover, labour market segmentation between enterprises of different 
ownership is a potential source of growing income inequality (Sicular and Zhao, 2002).   4
This paper uses the household survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), which gives detailed information on labour income as well as on individual and 
household characteristics for the year 1995. Our objective is to explain the observed differences 
in average wage between different ownership categories in order to assess the segmentation issue 
on the labour market in urban China. To do so, we first propose an econometric analysis on 
qualitative data to analyse the determinants of occupational choices and the allocation of the 
working population by type of enterprises. Second, we estimate Mincer wage equations by type of 
enterprises to explain the sources of observed differences in wages. Finally, we propose a 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on the global model (occupational choice, enterprise choice and 
wage determination) to provide a global evaluation of the sources of observed differences in 
wages and the different forms of segmentation in the Chinese labour market. 
Our results confirm previous findings of higher wages in SOEs and foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) compared to collective and domestic private enterprises. However, contrary to 
previous findings in the literature, we find no significant difference in hourly wages between 
SOEs and FIEs in 1995. Indeed, even though total income is significantly higher in FIEs, the gap 
between FIEs and SOEs vanishes when controlling for hours worked. Moreover, we find strong 
evidence of a segmented labour market with SOEs offering higher hourly wages than all other 
types of enterprises including FIEs. Indeed, if FIEs allow for higher global annual income, it is at 
the cost of longer working hours. There thus seems to be a trade-off between high total income 
and high hourly wages. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 briefly presents the evolution of the labour 
market in China over the last two decades. Section 2 proposes a literature review on labour 
segmentation issues in China. Section 3 provides some descriptive statistics on wage differentials  5
by type of enterprise ownership structure in 1995. Section 4 presents the methodology used for 
analysing labour market segmentation by ownership enterprise. Section 5 discusses econometric 
results on the choice of the enterprise type as well as on wage equations in the various type of 
enterprise ownership. Finally, section 6 proposes decomposition results of wage gaps between 
enterprises types and proposes an evaluation of the segmentation taking place on the Chinese 
labour market. 
 
1.  The evolution of the labour market in China 
 
Before reforms were launched at the end of the 70s, there was basically no labour market 
in China. Jobs and wages in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were determined within the central 
plan and a key function held by SOEs was to give employment to all the working-age population. 
The distribution of wages was based on an egalitarian principle, and within a given enterprise, 
promotion and wage increases were driven by age and experience within the work unit. In terms 
of income distribution between production factors, priority was given to capital accumulation 
necessary for industrial development. Hence, wages were maintained at a very low level. Finally, 
labour mobility was very limited both between sectors and regions.  
Since China launched economic reforms at the end of the 70s, the Chinese labour market 
experienced great changes. In particular, the emergence of the non-state sector led to a 
reallocation of the labour force out of the state sector (composed of firms under the direct 
control of the central or local governments). As indicated in Table 1, the share of the non-state  6
sector in employment grew steadily since 1978 and accounted for 35% in 1995
2. The non-state 
sector is composed of collective enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises
3, domestic private 
enterprises
4 and individual enterprises (getihu).
5 Collective enterprises have played an important 
role in offering additional employment at the early stage of the reforms (OECD, 2002). 
Otherwise, domestic private enterprises suffered from the restricting policies such as overtax, 
strict regulation, limited access to loans and skilled employees in the 1980s. During the 1990s, 
domestic private enterprises have experienced rapid development and gradually gained legitimacy, 
while the weight of collective enterprises in the economy has been reducing. As can be seen in 
Table 1, within the non-state sector, collective enterprises saw their share going down while the 
“private” sector grew from less than 5% in 1988 to 13% in 1995. Non-state enterprises (other 
than collective enterprises) became the leading engine of reform, introducing market forces into 
the Chinese economy. These enterprises are out of the central plan, their behaviour is closer to 
profit-maximisation objectives and they independently determine both their employment policy 
and salary scales.  
                                                 
2 In terms of industrial production, the growing importance of the non-state sector is even more remarkable: the 
non-state sector’s share of manufacturing output increased from 22.4 per cent in 1978 to 62.8 per cent in 1995. 
3 Firms with foreign ownership (sanzi qiye), are of three types: joint ventures (hezi jingying qiye), firms that have entered 
into co-operation agreements (hezuo jingying qiye) and wholly foreign-owned firms (waizi jingying qiye). Joint ventures are 
limited liability companies in which the Chinese and foreign partners invest and operate on a joint basis, sharing 
profits, losses and risks. Firms with co-operation agreements may involve a foreign partner, which provides 
technology and capital in exchange for a fixed return (Démurger, 2000). 
4 In 1988, the State Council issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) to govern the 
registration and management of private firms. This document defined a private firm as “a for-profit organization that 
is owned by individuals and employs more than eight people.” Firms that hired eight employees or less could still be 
registered as individual enterprises (getihu). The TSPE identified three types of private firms: those under sole 
ownership, partnerships, and limited liability companies. However, it was only in March 1999 that private ownership 
and the rule of law were formally incorporated into the Chinese Constitution.  
5 There are another two forms of ownership: domestic joint-ventures (lianying qiye), and share-holding companies 
(gufenzhi qiye).    7











1978 78.3 21.5  -  -  0.2 
1980 76.2  23  -  -  0.8 
1983 74.7 23.4  -  -  1.9 
1984 70.6 26.3  -  -  2.8 
1985 70.2  26  0.05  -  3.5 
1986 70.2 25.7  0.09  -  3.6 
1987 70 25.3  0.15  -  4.1 
1988 70 24.7  0.2  -  4.6 
1989 70.2 24.3  0.3  -  4.5 
1990 70.2  24  0.4  0.4  4.2 
1991 69.9 23.8  0.6  0.4  4.5 
1992 69.7 23.2  0.9  0.6  4.7 
1993 68.4 21.3  0.8  1.2  5.8 
1994 66.7 19.5  1.2  2  7.3 
1995 64.9 18.1  1.4  2.8  9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1994, 1996). 
Note: From 1984, percentages do not sum up to 100% because of the existence of other ownership types (see note 5 
above for details). 
 
In the meantime, the state-owned sector also experienced important reforms. In a first 
step, some autonomy in decision-making for employment and wages has been given to SOEs 
managers. They were authorised to retain part of their profit and share it with their employees in 
the form of bonus wage payments. Bonus wages were supposed to provide incentives to 
employees and increase the overall productivity of SOEs. However, due to high supervision 
costs, the premium was often distributed on an egalitarian basis, and its impact is controversial. 
From 1993 onwards, SOEs have been allowed to put workers in the situation of waiting for a job 
(xiagang) by giving them subsistence revenue. Nevertheless, State intervention continues to  8
influence SOEs behaviours. Constrained by the inefficiency of their organisation structure, and 
submitted to growing competition from the non-state sector, SOEs have been facing a difficult 
situation, leading to massive lay-offs in the second half of 1990s. 
Both the evolution of the non-state sector and changes in the state-owned sector have 
had significant impacts on income distribution as well as on the allocation of the labour force. 
Since reforms have been launched, income inequality among urban workers has been increasing, 
and the ownership structure of the economy played an important role in determining the changes 
of income inequality (Park et al., 2003; Xu and Zou, 2000). Analyses of this increase in inequality 
need to account for the determinants of wage differentials among urban workers and in particular 
between different types of enterprises, claiming for a deeper analysis of the segmentation issue.  
 
2.  Labour market segmentation in China: literature review 
 
A growing number of works has been studying changes in the China wage structure over 
the last decade. Recently, the wider availability of nation-wide household surveys has allowed for 
deeper statistical analyses of this issue, focusing on various complementary aspects. In particular, 
a large number of papers focus on rising returns to education, emphasizing the higher returns to 
education experienced by the non-state sector, including both private or individual enterprises 
and foreign-invested enterprises (Maurer-Fazio, 1999; Fu and Gabriel, 2000; Zhang and Zhao, 
2002; Li, 2003). Another area of research focuses on the wage gap between different groups of 
workers, analysing labour market segmentation between rural migrants and urban residents 
(Maurer-Fazio and Dinh, 2002; Meng and Zhang, 2001; Meng, 2002; Knight et al., 1999; Fan, 
2001, 2002) or discrimination against women (Meng and Miller, 1995; Qian, 1996; Gustafsson  9
and Li, 2000, Rozelle et al., 2002). Most of these studies find that ownership structure of 
enterprises is a significant explanatory factor for observed wage gaps.  
Hence, the empirical literature on the Chinese wage structure shows the potentially 
important role of enterprises ownership in explaining wage-setting behaviours. Moreover, as 
mobility between enterprises is constrained, the urban labour market in China is more likely to be 
segmented by ownership type
6. This question has been studied in various papers, including 
Putterman (1992), Howell (1997), Dong and Bowles (2002) and Zhao (2001, 2002). This 
literature usually claims that the Chinese labour market is segmented by ownership. However, 
only Dong and Bowles (2002) and Zhao (2001, 2002) have done econometric analysis and results 
differ depending on data and econometric methods used and the magnitude of segmentation 
phenomena is usually not formally evaluated.  
Dong and Bowles (2002) analyse the segmentation issue by ownership type, using survey 
data on SOEs, township and village enterprises, joint-ventures, and wholly foreign-invested 
enterprises in the light industrial goods sector in 1998. They find no significant differences in 
returns to education among firms of different ownership types, but significant differences 
appears in returns to experience, rewards to experience being significantly higher in foreign-
invested enterprises than in the three other categories of ownership. They conclude in favour of a 
decreasing segmentation of the labour market by ownership, at least in the light industrial goods 
                                                 
6 According to Dong and Bowles (2002), in transition economies, “dualism is typically characterised as resulting from 
the coexistence of firms that still operate, at least partially, according to the norms established under the centrally 
planned economy and new firms that have emerged during as part of the transition to a market-oriented economy. 
[…] The existence of both types of firms during the transition is likely to lead to segmented labour markets with 
wage-setting behaviour varying between the two sectors as a result of differences in the market orientation of firms 
[…].” (p. 171).  10
sector, and acknowledge that segmentation by firm or by regions might nevertheless be  an 
important force in explaining wage differentials.  
Closer to our approach are the works by Zhao (2001, 2002). These papers look at wage 
differentials among enterprises of four types of ownership (SOEs, urban collectives, domestic 
private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises). Zhao finds that, after taking account of 
non-wage benefits, workers in SOEs earn significantly more than workers in urban collective or 
domestic private enterprises. She claims that because of the duality of the Chinese economy, 
foreign-invested enterprises have to pay a higher salary to attract skilled workers. On the 
opposite, they have access to an abundant non-skilled labour force, to which they can offer 
relatively low wages. However, the dataset used in these papers do not include information on 
hours worked, nor details on non-wage income
7. In our paper, we show that results can be quite 
different when these two aspects are accounted for in a more adequate way
8.  
Based on the different results from the existing literature, our paper aims at testing and 
evaluating the magnitude of urban labour market segmentation in China, using household survey 
data from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Chinese Household Income Project) in 1995. 
We examine whether the Chinese urban labour market is segmented by ownership structure and 
how much this segmentation contributes to wage differentials among workers. We first estimate a 
multinomial logit model to analyse the determinants of the choice of sectors between SOEs at 
central or provincial level, local publicly owned enterprises, urban collective enterprises, private 
or individual enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. We then estimate wage equations by 
                                                 
7 Zhao (2002) uses “secondary data” containing information on pension, housing, and health care, which cannot be 
directly matched with the wage data used. 
8 Even though some dimensions of non-wage income are still not accounted for, CHIP data include information on 
wages as well as bonuses, allowances, subsidies, and income in kind at the individual level.  11
type of enterprises to explain the observed wage differentials among the five categories of 
enterprises. Finally, we propose a decomposition of wage differentials into what comes from the 
distribution of individual characteristics and what can be imputed to the segmentation of the 
labour market.  
 
3.  Wage differentials in 1995: some descriptive statistics 
 
1. Data set and variables definition 
Our data come from the 1995 survey of the China Household Income Project (CHIP). 
These data were collected in 1996 by a team headed by the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (Riskin et al., 2001), and cover 6,931 households and 21,694 
individuals in urban China. The survey covers 11 provinces
9, among which only 4 are located 
along the coast (Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong).  
The sample we use in this study is composed of 11,238 workers. We chose to consider 
only individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and earning 
(positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not included in the sample, since 
we cannot disentangle wages from profit in their case.  
The wage variable is defined as being the sum of the base salary, bonuses, allowances and 
subsidies (except those allowances given while “waiting for a job”, xiagang), other wages 
(including overtime wages and wages for special circumstances), other income from work unit 
(except hardship allowances) and income in kind. As a base for comparison in the descriptive 
                                                 
9 The sample includes the following provinces: Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, 
Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu and Hubei.  12
part, we also use labour income, which includes income for individual or private enterprises 
owners. Labour income is thus composed of the wage variable, plus other income from labour 
(including from a second job) and private or individual enterprise proprietor’s pre-tax net 
income. Hourly wages are defined as the ratio between wages and the number of declared hours 
worked in a year.  
We consider 5 types of enterprises ownership: SOEs at central or provincial level, local 
publicly-owned enterprises, urban collective enterprises, private or individual enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises (comprising both Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign-owned 
enterprises). Note that, at the aggregate level, SOEs at central or provincial level account for 
9.3% of the total number of SOEs, while local publicly-enterprises account for the remaining 
90.7%. However, SOEs at central or provincial level are on average much bigger since they 
employ 37.7% of the total labour force in the state-owned sector
10. 
 
2. Wage differentials by ownership 
As can be seen from Table 2, both wages and labour income are the highest in foreign-
invested enterprises and the lowest in urban collectives. Among state-owned enterprises, where 
wages rank second after foreign-invested enterprises, people working in SOEs at central or 
provincial level tend to earn more than people working in local SOEs. Finally, workers employed 
in private or individual enterprises earn a little bit more than those working in urban collectives. 
The decomposition of wages by components confirms that non-wage benefits are 
important when accounting for differences between the state and the non-state sectors (Zhao, 
2002). Although our dataset might not include all kind of non-wage benefits (such as pensions or 
personal connections), Table 2 nevertheless shows that the highest bonuses and subsidies are 
indeed given in SOEs as compared to the non-state sector (both domestic and foreign). In 
                                                 
10 Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 1995.  13
particular, it shows that SOEs give much more subsidies (such as housing, health care or child 
care subsidies) to their employees than non-state enterprises.  
 
Table 2 – Average wage by ownership and its components 
Ownership categories  SOEs at central 











Number of obs.  3094  6182  1702  113  147 
Wage 6997  6140  4795  5208  8213 
    Base wage  4021  3519  3077  -  6528 
    Bonus  1044  996  730  213  929 
    Subsidies  1323  1088  631  58  479 
    Income in kind  118  92  67  70  87 
Labour income  7078  6243  4953  6422  8259 
Source: Calculated by authors with the 1995 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: 1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and earning 
(positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered. 
2. The wage variable is defined as being the sum of the base salary, bonuses, allowances and subsidies, other 
wages, other income from work unit and income in kind. 
3. Labour income is composed of the wage variable, plus other income from labour and private or individual 
enterprise proprietor’s pre-tax net income. 
 
Mean tests show that in terms of average wage, employees from foreign-invested 
enterprises earn significantly more than employees from SOEs at central or provincial level, and 
the latter earn significantly more than employees from local publicly owned enterprises. 
Employees from urban collectives and private or individual enterprises come last, the difference 
between the two being not significant. 
Results presented Table 2 are quite usual in the literature and seem to be common 
knowledge for Chinese workers. However, taking into account hours of work leads to quite 
different and rarely mentioned results. Indeed, as far as hourly wage is concerned (Table 3), 
employees from foreign-invested enterprises and SOEs at central or provincial level still earn 
more than others, but the difference between the two categories is no longer significant. Thus, 
although employees from foreign enterprises appear as being the best paid in terms of total wage, 
they work significantly more in a week than employees from the state sector, which reduces 
considerably the differences in wage rates among the two categories. At the bottom of the hourly  14
wage scale, we still find employees from private or individual enterprises. Indeed, the number of 
hours worked in a week is the highest for the latter category, which makes employees earn much 
less both in terms of total wage and hourly wage.  
 
Table 3 – Total wage, hourly wage and number of hours worked in 1995 














Number of obs.  3094  6182  1702  113  147 
Average wage  6997  6140  4795  5208  8213 
Coefficient of variation  0.51  0.59  0.68  0.92  0.76 
Average hourly wage  3.49  3.02  2.41  2.04  3.73 
Coefficient of variation  0.64  0.71  0.83  0.996  0.80 
Worked hours per week  41.4  42.3  43.3  56  47 
Coefficient of variation  0.17  0.18  0.22  0.29  0.19 
Source: Calculated by authors with the 1995 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: See Table 2. The worked hours per week are calculated by multiplying the number of work hours on an 
average day by average number of work days per week in 1995. 
 
Finally, Tables 4 and 5 show total wage and hourly wage comparisons by sex, educational 
level and region. On average, men tend to be better paid than women, wages tend to increase 
with the level of education, and workers living in coastal fast-growing provinces (Jiangsu and 
Guangdong) tend to earn more than those living in non-coastal provinces. However, concerning 
the level of education, a closer look at differences reveals that in private or individual enterprises, 
a college level of education does not imply a higher salary. On the other side, in foreign-invested 
enterprises, the most remarkable effect of education is to be found for highest level of education 
(professional or college). 
  15
Table 4 – Average wage by ownership and by working population 
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Notes:   1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and 
earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered. 
2. Number of observations between brackets. 
3. “Coast” refers to Jiangsu and Guangdong. 
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Table 5 – Average hourly wage by ownership and by working population 
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Notes:   See Table 4. 
 
3. Wage distribution by ownership 
Coefficients of variation given Table 3 reveal that the highest differences among 
employees happen to be in private or individual enterprises, while the lowest differences are 
observed in SOEs at central or provincial level. This result comes at no surprise since private 
enterprises include very different types of units, from tiny street shops to small-scale firms. 
These findings are corroborated by kernel density estimations for the distribution of 
income by ownership category, respectively for the logarithm of total wages (Figure 1) and of 
hourly wages (Figure 2). Each graph shows the distribution for the whole sample (sal, salh) and by 
ownership category sub-sample (SOEs to FIEs). 
  17








6 7 8 9 10 11 12
sal Central and provincial SOEs Local SOEs COEs PIEs FIEs
 
Notes: In order to better visualise the density distribution, we consider the logarithm of the total wage only 
for those with total wage above 1000. 
sal represents the total wage distribution of the whole sample. Local SOEs refer to local publicly owned 
enterprises, COEs to urban collective enterprises, PIEs to private or individual enterprises, and FIEs to 
foreign invested enterprises. 
  
Kernel densities show a more concentrated wage distribution for SOEs and urban 
collectives (COEs) with thin distribution tails, whereas private or individual enterprises (PIEs) 
and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) have a much wider wage distribution. Figure 1 also tends 
to show a bimodal distribution for FIEs’ wages, with a lower second mode for lower wages. This 
result is consistent with Zhao (2001)’s hypothesis of a segmented labour market between high 
and low-educated workers within FIEs. However, once hours of work are taken into account, the 
distribution becomes unimodal (Figure 2). Once again, apparent high wages in FIEs for high 
educated workers are to be attributed in a large extent to longer working days.   
  18













-2 -1 0 1 2 3 45
salh Central and provincial SOEs Local SOEs COEs PIEs FIEs
 
Notes: In order to better visualise the density distribution, we consider the logarithm of the hourly wage only 
for those with total wage above 1000. 
salh represents the hourly wage distribution of the whole sample. Local SOEs refer to local publicly owned 
enterprises, COEs to urban collective enterprises, PIEs to private or individual enterprises, and FIEs to 
foreign invested enterprises. 
 
Kernel density estimations for hourly wages further illustrate our previous findings on 
differences in mean wages for SOEs and FIEs. Indeed, the difference between SOEs at central 
or provincial level and FIEs wage distributions observed for total wages (Figure 1) is much 
reduced for hourly wages. Figure 2 actually shows that the difference between the two 
distributions mostly comes from a greater variance for FIEs. Indeed, FIEs pay more workers at 
lower as well as at higher hourly wages than SOEs at central and provincial level, the modes for 
both distributions being quite similar.  
It is thus true that working for a FIE might lead to higher wages, especially for high 
educated workers. However, it is a risky choice since FIEs have a wider wage scale and offer 
more below-average wages than SOEs.  
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4.  Methodology for analysing labour market segmentation by enterprise ownership 
 
Our objective is to explain observed wage disparities between enterprises of different 
ownership structure using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method [Oaxaca (1973), Blinder 
(1973)]. We intend here to isolate what is due to structural socio-economical differences between 
workers of different types of enterprises, and what is due to a segmentation phenomenon. The 
basic idea of this decomposition technique is to propose counterfactual situations corresponding 
to income that would be earned by workers observed in one type of enterprise, had they been 
faced with the income generating model observed for another type of enterprise. By “income 
generating model” we understand here the mechanisms through which individual income is 
determined by economic mechanisms given his/her socio-economic characteristics. Comparing 
observed and counter-factual income thus allows for an evaluation of segmentation phenomena. 
For example, a difference between observed income for SOEs’ workers and the counterfactual 
income obtained under the “foreign enterprises model” provides an evaluation of the 
segmentation that occurs between these two types of enterprises. Indeed, if there was no 
segmentation, income under the SOEs’ model (observed income) should be equal to income 
under the FIEs’ model (counterfactual) for any given socio-economic characteristics.  
Formally, let wij represent income of individual i belonging to enterprise type j. wij may be 
assumed to depend on three sets of arguments:  
i)  Individual observable socio-demographic characteristics or those of his/her 
household (x), 
ii)  Unobservable characteristics summarized (ε ),  20
iii)  A set of parameters corresponding to the income model linking socio-
demographic characteristics to observed income (β ). 
The income generating process can thus be written as a function H of these three sets of 
arguments: 
 (1)     ) ; , ( j ij ij ij x H w β ε =  
Within this framework, observed differences in average income between two given types 
of enterprises may come from two different potential sources: 
i)  A difference in average socio-demographic characteristics of workers in the two 
types of enterprises, 
ii)  A difference in the income generating models between the two types of 
enterprises. 
The first source of differences in average income between enterprises (i) corresponds to 
market-based differences in income, since differences in socio-demographic characteristics such 
as education or age lead to differences in average income. Different types of enterprises being 
specialised in different sectors, the socio-demographic structure of workers naturally differs. The 
latter source of differences in average income between enterprises (ii) reveals a segmentation 
process since individuals with the same socio-demographic characteristics will have a different 
income depending on which type of enterprises they are working for.  
It is thus possible to decompose observed income differences into these two components 
as follows (2 enterprise types: s and f): 
(2)    Explained difference:      ) ; , ( ) ; , ( s if if s is is
i
sf x H x H E β ε β ε − =  
(3)   Segmentation:       ) ; , ( ) ; , ( f is is s is is
i
sf x H x H S β ε β ε − =    21
Indeed, the “explained difference” 
i
sf E  corresponds to the difference in income between 
workers of enterprise type s and workers of enterprise type f controlling for differences in 
remuneration of individual characteristics x. Symmetrically, the “segmentation effect” 
i
sf S  
corresponds to the difference in income due to differences in remuneration of individual 
characteristics x between enterprise types s and f, for a given socio-demographic structure (that 
observed for workers in enterprise type s). The preceding formulation presented here at the 
individual level can then be averaged to evaluate the overall mean effect.  
In other words, our point here is to answer the following two questions: 
i)  What would be the difference in average income between workers in enterprises 
type s and f if workers were facing the same model in terms of income determinants? (Explained 
difference) 
ii)  What would be the difference in average income between workers in enterprises 
type s and f if they had the same socio-demographic characteristics? (Segmentation) 
This approach falls in the line of the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
methodology. A common problem with this methodology is path dependence. Indeed, the two 
effects are likely to depend on the reference population that is used to evaluate them. In other 
words, it is generally the case that: 
E
sf  ≠  E
fs  and  S
sf  ≠  S
fs 
In the application that follows, this ambiguity is taken into account by considering 
simultaneously alternative definitions of the various effects, which provides a robustness test for 
the decomposition results. 
The implementation of the decomposition methodology thus includes three phases. First, 
we estimate the remuneration structure of all types of enterprises correcting for potential  22
selection biases. Second, we simulate counter-factual incomes for all observed workers and all 
enterprises types. Finally, we compute average counter-factual incomes. 
Since the choice of the type of enterprise and expected remuneration are closely linked 
mechanisms, estimating wage functions for various enterprises types implies to deal with the 
selection bias issue. Here, we model the enterprise type choice through a multinomial logit model 
and we estimate Mincerian earning functions correcting for selection biases through the 
procedure proposed by Dahl (2002). The first step estimation of enterprise type already provides 
valuable information, which is discussed in detail before turning to the analysis of earning 
functions and lastly, evaluating segmentation issues through the decomposition procedure 
presented above. 
 
5.  The determinants of enterprise choice and wage differentials according to 
ownership structure 
 
1. Enterprise type choice behaviours in 1995 
Tables 6 and 7 show estimation results of the multinomial logit model on the choice of 
enterprise ownership of respectively, the male and the female populations, with the choice of the 
SOEs at central or provincial level as the compared base category. Before interpreting these 
results, we should mention that the estimations of occupational choice equations in China are to 
be handled with care since in 1995, the labour market was still under creation and individual 
occupational choices were thus facing hard constraints
11.  
                                                 
11 Until 1995, graduate students from universities in China were assigned to a particular employment according to 
central planning related labour allocation mechanisms.  23
Table 6 – Estimation results of the Multinomial Logit Model for the enterprise ownership choice of men 
    Local SOEs  Urban Collective 
Enterprises 




                 
Education   -0.575 (-5.00) -0.269 (-14.02)  -0.230 (-4.80)  0.204 (0.41) 
Age 0.002 (0.08) 0.049 (1.07)  0.231 (2.08)  -0.109 (-1.15)
Age
2 -0.000 (-0.58) -0.001 (-1.71)  -0.003 (-2.38)  0.001 (0.83) 
Communist 0.240 (3.57) -0.602 (-4.77)  -1.847 (-3.03)  -0.303 (-0.82)
Number of children under 6  0.048 (0.54) -0.237 (-1.63)  -0.354 (-1.14)  -0.383 (-1.03)
Number of children at school  -0.253 (-3.57) -0.373 (-3.12)  -0.534 (-1.77)  -0.461 (-1.37)
Number of dependent members  0.131 (1.11) 0.282 (1.69) -0.373 (-0.90)  0.355 (0.98) 
Size of household  -0.011 (-0.06) 0.631 (2.23)  1.657 (2.58)  1.100 (1.68) 



























































































Number of observations   6172 
Log likelihood     -5885 
 
Notes: The dummy variables by province are not presented in the table. The base category is “State-owned enterprises at central or provincial level”. 
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Table 7 – Estimation results of the Multinomial Logit Model for the enterprise ownership choice of women 
    Local SOEs  Urban Collective 
Enterprises 




            
Education   -0.075  -5.14  -0.307  -15.58  -0.324  -6.70  -0.145  -2.43 
Age 0.009  0.25  0.062  1.26  -0.078  -0.75  0.123  0.85 
Age
2 -0.000  -0.69  -0.001  -1.82  0.001  0.46  -0.003  -1.20 
Communist -0.018  -0.19  -0.164  -1.18  -1.375  -1.84  -0.532  -0.84 
Number of children under 6  0.239  2.28  0.004  0.03  0.242  0.85  -0.419  -0.93 
Number of children at school  -0.089  -1.10  -0.344  -3.16  -0.348  -1.34  -0.274  -0.65 
Number of dependent members  0.278  2.05  0.292  1.72  0.044  0.11  0.314  0.62 
Size of household  -0.313  -1.45  0.069  0.25  1.149  1.85  -0.969  -1.31 



























































































Number of observations  5584 
Log likelihood   -5560 
 
Notes: See Table 6. 
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Explanatory variables include individual characteristics (education, age, communist 
membership, the way of finding the current job, and geographical residence) as well as household 
characteristics (number of children of less than 6 years old, numbers of children above 16 at 
school, number of dependant members, size of household, and relationship to the head of 
household). As can be seen from Table 6, for men, education tends to divert from going to both 
collective enterprises and private and individual enterprises. More educated men tend to choose 
to work either in SOEs or in foreign-invested enterprises (the preference between these two 
categories being not significant). Moreover, SOEs at central or provincial level tend to attract 
more skilled workers than local publicly-owned enterprises. The same order of preferences is also 
found for women (Table 7), with a significant preference for SOEs against foreign-invested 
enterprises amongst educated women. 
In terms of age, estimations reveal that for younger men, the elder, the more they tend to 
work in private or individual enterprises. After a threshold age ranging from 38 to 42 depending 
on the enterprise type, the tendency is reversed: older people tend to work in any other type of 
enterprises rather than private or individual enterprises. In particular, the difference is significant 
for the choice in favour of SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises (against private or individual 
enterprises). These results imply that on average, middle-aged workers are those who have the 
highest probability to work in private or individual enterprises, and to a certain extent in 
collective enterprises. Similar results, while less clear-cut, are found for women. A potential 
explanation for these results is that young men entering the labour market mostly start working in 
SOEs or in the foreign sector, before acquiring enough economic, human and social capital to 
switch to the riskier private sector. Moreover, a great number of elder workers, which have been  26
working their whole life in the state-owned sector, have little chances to switch to the less-
secured private sector
12. 
As can be expected, Communist Party members (both men and women) tend to have a 
lower probability to work in private or individual enterprises, and even tend to work more in 
SOEs than in urban collectives. The only “surprising” result here is that they also tend to work 
more in local publicly-owned enterprises than in SOEs at the central or provincial level. 
Results for household size and the number of children and elderly in the household show 
that, the larger the household, the higher probability women have to work in private or individual 
enterprises, local SOEs and, to some extent, urban collectives. This result can certainly be 
explained by to the higher flexibility in hours worked in these enterprises, which allows for more 
time spent with children and elderly. For men, having a child over 16 at school raises the 
probability of working in SOEs. This type of enterprises seems to be a good compromise in 
terms of income resources needed for long studies expenses, free time allocated to children and 
insurance against job loss (the latter being true at least for the year under study: 1995).  
Results for the channel through which workers found their jobs are quite straightforward. 
Self-found jobs correspond to foreign-invested enterprises and private or individual enterprises 
and designation by the State mostly concerns SOEs. More interestingly is the impact of the 
relationship to household head. Indeed, women spouses tend to favour private or individual 
enterprises and working children living with their parents have a higher probability of choosing 
foreign-invested enterprises. Of course, some endogeneity is taking place here, but these patterns 
                                                 
12 Our results are consistent with Zhao (2001), which finds the highest level of education in SOEs, followed by 
foreign-invested enterprises, collective enterprises, and private or individual enterprises. Collective enterprises are 
also found to have a higher female to male worker ratio, and, together with private or individual enterprises, to hire 
older workers than SOEs or foreign-invested enterprises (with no threshold effect).  27
also correspond to risk diversification behaviours (85.7% of household heads in our sample are 
employed by central or local SOEs). 
 
2. Income functions  
Tables 8 and 9 present results of Mincer-type wage regressions by enterprise ownership, 
estimated using Dahl (2002) bias correction method
13. As previously stated, the wage variable is 
measured by hourly wage in 1995. Two specifications are considered. The “basic” specification 
includes human capital characteristics (education and experience), communist membership and 
geographical residence variables (province dummies
14). The “augmented” specification adds three 
types of variables: the nature of job, the occupation and the economic sector
15.  
Wage equation regressions reported in Table 8 show higher returns to education in 
foreign-invested enterprises
16. In terms of gender differences, returns to education appear to be 
higher for women, especially in SOEs at central or provincial level. For men, returns to education 
are higher in local publicly-owned enterprises than in SOEs at central or provincial level, while 
they happen not to be significant in urban collectives. On the contrary, for women, returns to 
education are higher in SOEs at central or provincial level than in both local publicly-owned 
enterprises and urban collectives. 
                                                 
13 See Schmertmann (1994), Dahl (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2003) for a discussion of Dahl (2002) advantage 
over Lee (1983) approach to selection bias correction with a multinomial Logit model. However, most of our results 
are robust to the correction method. Here we use Dahl’s method with one probability (observed choice) and a 5 
degrees polynomial specification. 
14 Guangdong is the reference province. 
15 The reference categories for the nature of job, the occupation and the economic sector are respectively permanent 
workers, unskilled workers, and industry. 
16 Note that for private or individual enterprises, returns to education appear to be even higher, but the coefficient is 
weakly significant and is thus not significantly different from coefficients for any other types of enterprises.  28
Contrary to Dong and Bowles (2002)
17, we find that returns to education are significantly 
higher in foreign-invested enterprises than in SOEs (both central and local) and urban collectives 
for men. For women, we find that returns to education are significantly higher in central SOEs as 
compared to both local SOEs and urban collectives. Compared to Dong and Bowles (2002), we 
find much higher returns to education, ranging from 2% to 10% for one additional year of 
schooling depending on enterprise ownership. Our results are however consistent with both Li 
(2003) and Zhao (2002)
18. This makes Chinese rates of return to education more in line with 
standard Asian rates of return close to 10 % (Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
The usual concave form for actual work experience
19 is found for SOEs and urban 
collectives but returns to experience do not appear to be significant for both private and foreign 
enterprises. We find wage peaks occurring at lower experience levels than previous studies (Liu, 
1998; Johnson and Chow, 1997). Our results however correspond to Li (2003)’s. Moreover, 
differences between SOEs and urban collectives can be observed with steeper but more concave 
returns to experience in local SOEs for women and higher returns to experience in urban 
collectives for men. The absence of significant returns to experience in both private and foreign 
enterprises stresses the specificity of these newly developed sectors, in which experience 
accumulated on former SOEs positions does not correspond to strong efficiency gains. 
                                                 
17 Their estimation is based on 1998 enterprise survey data from Dalian and Xiamen. Their estimated rate of returns 
to education is 2.3% and they find none of the interactive ownership dummies on human capital variables to be 
statistically significant. 
18 Using the same data base (CHIP) for 1995 and measure of hourly wages, Li (2003) gets the overall return to 
education of 5.3%, not far from our results. Moreover, taking together private or individual enterprises and foreign-
invested enterprises as the private sector, he finds that the private sector rewards the highly educated more, while the 
state-owned sector rewards the less educated more. Using a 1996 urban household survey, Zhao (2002) finds the 
returns to education to be 4.2% for SOEs, 3.2% for collective enterprises, 0.9% for private or individual enterprises, 
and 7.9% for foreign-invested enterprises. Our results are consistent with these findings. 
19 We use the actual number of years of work experience given by the 1995 CHIP survey instead of calculating 
potential experience from age and the level of education.  29
Table 8 - Basic wage equation estimations by Dahl’s bias correction method 
 Central  SOEs Local SOEs COEs  PIEs  FIEs 
  Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman   
S e x          - 0 . 0 2 2   0.031 
         -0.08  0.27 
Education 0.020  0.074  0.038  0.047  0.025  0.044  0.118  0.081 
  3.21  7.01  10.86  8.66  1.10  2.85  1.74  3.14 
Experience 0.044  0.066  0.044  0.074  0.066  0.060  0.046  0.039 
  9.90  9.19  13.06  15.26  6.50  6.84  0.73  1.60 
Experience
2 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  -6.44  -5.50  -8.01  -11.40  -5.13  -5.76  -0.36  -0.69 
Communist 0.029  0.066  0.074  0.098  0.139  0.107  0.969  -0.009 
  1.06  1.44  2.81  3.13  1.42  1.55  1.11  -0.04 
Beijing -0.590  -0.389  -0.247  -0.223  -0.457  -0.290    
  -6.48  -2.96  -4.66  -3.72  -2.79  -2.01    
Shanxi -0.847  -0.636  -0.843  -0.772  -0.930  -1.021    
  -8.08  -4.33  -14.86  -12.74  -6.39  -9.96    
Liaoning -0.777  -0.826  -0.644  -0.595  -0.612  -0.856    
  -10.03  -7.67  -15.31  -11.75  -5.69  -10.10    
Jiangsu -0.440  -0.475  -0.413  -0.320  -0.507  -0.546    
  -5.97  -4.44  -9.64  -5.77  -4.98  -6.34    
Anhui -0.825  -0.897  -0.708  -0.524  -0.768  -0.786    
  -9.76  -7.59  -13.92  -8.23  -6.73  -8.58    
Henan -0.908  -0.781  -0.894  -0.873  -0.922  -1.112    
  -11.17  -6.54  -19.76  -15.62  -7.50  -12.02    
Hubei -0.753  -0.526  -0.625  -0.492  -0.721  -0.736    
  -9.26  -4.38  -14.10  -9.32  -6.05  -7.29    
Sichuan -0.628  -0.530  -0.656  -0.488  -0.725  -0.788    
  -8.11  -4.75  -15.69  -9.35  -6.56  -9.56    
Yunnan -0.914  -0.756  -0.640  -0.536  -0.732  -0.856    
  -11.33  -6.39  -14.50  -10.44  -5.76  -8.46    
Gansu  -0.979 -0.653 -0.858 -0.822 -0.917 -1.226     
  -10.60  -4.56  -15.87  -12.03  -5.06  -11.08    
Coastal         0.803  0.359 
         2.79  2 .49 
_m1  4.061 -5.03 15.82  -34.42 1.36  1.57 -18.63 4.50 
  0.50 -0.62 0.32 -1.46 0.21 0.32 -1.10 0.31 
_m2  -19.92  38.40  -65.39 175.86 -27.07 -11.36 264.11 -97.4 
  -0.40 0.59 -0.31 1.51 -0.51 -0.37 1.35 -0.30 
_m3  58.21  -161.52 137.39 -407.54 134.24  39.14  -1177.6 908.01 
  0.41 -0.69 0.31 -1.49 0.68 0.44 -1.33 0.33 
_m4  -80.52  299.23 -141.24 440.77 -269.86 -60.43 2078.08  -3685.2
  -0.43 0.77 -0.32 1.44 -0.84 -0.53 1.26 -0.37 
_m5  40.11 -197.13 56.25 -179.92 181.65 32.58 -1247.8  5398.5 
  0.43 -0.82 0.32 -1.36 0.98 0.61 -1.19 0.42 
Constant  0.598 0.382 -1.168 2.303 0.523 0.281 -1.732  -0.527 
  1.20  1.03  -0.26  1.28  1.00  0.71  -1.64  -1.33 
Observations 1830  1227  3275  2862  652  1029  107  144 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.25 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage. The five categories are: central or provincial state-
owned enterprises, local publicly owned enterprises, urban collective enterprises (COEs), private or individual  30
enterprises (PIEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The coastal dummy variable takes 1 for Jiangsu and 
Guangdong, and 0 for other provinces. 
 
As found in other works on pooled data for all types of enterprises (Gustafsson and Li, 
2000;  Li, 2003; Appleton et al., 2003), our estimations show that being a Communist Party 
member raises significantly wages for those working in local publicly-owned enterprises. 
However, for other categories of enterprises, the impact of Party membership is non-significant. 
Table 9 presents the augmented wage equation estimations. The introduction of 
additional explanatory variables leads to a non-significant effect of education in private or 
individual enterprises. Returns to education in foreign-invested enterprises remain the highest 
and very significant. We can see that, in general, coefficients for education are less significant. 
The decrease in significance can be imputed to the fact that the introduction of additional 
variables captures part of the education effect. Indeed, as previously discussed, more educated 
people tend to favour more dynamic sectors and occupations.  
We now turn to the effect of additional variables entered in Table 9. First, concerning 
occupation, we can see that wages earned by men in SOEs at central or provincial level, as well as 
in urban collectives do not depend upon their occupation. For women working in central SOEs 
and men working in local SOEs, unskilled workers are paid significantly less than those having 
any other occupation. The wage difference between unskilled workers and other employees in 
private or individual enterprises as well as in foreign-invested enterprises is not significant, other 
things being equal. This implies that there is no segmentation between skilled and non-skilled 
workers, wages differences being only due to different endowments in socio-economic 
characteristics of workers such as education or experience.  31
Table 9 – Augmented wage equation estimations (Dahl) 
 Central  SOEs Local SOEs COEs  PIEs  FIEs 
  Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman    
Sex         -0.102  -0.033
         -0.31  -0.27 
Education 0.018  0.060  0.020  0.024  0.012  0.022  0.042  0.070 
  2.61  5.16  4.94  3.98  0.51  1.36  0.48  2.36 
Experience 0.040  0.060  0.041  0.075  0.069  0.060  0.008  0.025 
  9.13  7.95  11.98  14.93  6.48  6.62  0.11  1.00 
Experience
2 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002  0.000  -0.000
  -5.64  -4.82  -7.76  -11.98  -5.34  -5.89  0.06  -0.04 
Communist 0.041  0.075  0.047  0.094  0.105  0.045  0.183  -0.202
  1.45  1.54  1.71  2.87  1.00  0.63  0.17  -0.81 
Job nature          
   Long-term contract  -0.034  0.026  -0.015 0.001  0.029  -0.057  -0.862  0.252 
  -0.90  0.48  -0.61  0.03  0.49  -1.31  -0.50  1.34 
   Temporary  -0.435  -0.662  -0.064 -0.186  0.166  -0.068  -0.847  0.274 
  -3.43  -4.81  -0.68  -1.86  1.13  -0.83  -0.54  1.23 
   Other  -1.063  -0.908  -0.148 -0.230  -0.185 -0.247  -1.024  0.491 
  -3.25  -3.16  -0.91  -1.15  -0.74  -1.91  -0.67  1.97 
Occupation           
    Technical worker  0.013  0.306  0.192  0.230  0.131  0.253  1.046  0.401 
  0.26  4.91  5.29  5.74  1.33  3.11  1.08  1.64 
    Head of institution  0.061  0.433  0.199  0.058  0.016  0.150  -  - 
  0.87  3.28  4.18  0.65  0.08  0.71 -  - 
    Division head  -0.003  0.270  0.181  0.204  0.074  0.250  - 0.134 
  -0.06  2.89  4.35  3.12  0.63  1.97 -  0.35 
    Office worker  -0.002  0.191  0.103  0.100  0.053  0.081  -0.512 0.285 
  -0.03  3.15  3.01  2.76  0.56  1.32  -0.45  1.40 
    Skilled worker  0.061  0.186  0.062  0.042  0.014  -0.022  0.878  0.100 
  1.40  3.16  1.97  1.13  0.19  -0.43  1.22  0.57 
    Other  0.018  -0.033  0.111  0.117  -0.026 0.016  -0.393 0.062 
  0.23  -0.34  2.02  2.35  -0.20  0.23  -0.76  0.27 
Economic sector           
     Agriculture etc.  0.069  0.069  -0.028 -0.129  0.242  0.116  -  - 
  1.35  0.83  -0.47  -1.56  1.12  0.50 -  - 
     Construction  -0.113  -0.129  -0.015 -0.052  0.207  0.087  1.618 -0.204
       -1.70  -1.30  -0.31  -0.72  1.56  0.66  1.36  -0.31 
     Communication  0.085  0.119  0.049  0.052  0.140  -0.067  -1.279  0.457 
  1.88  1.58  1.20  0.88  1.17  -0.64  -1.81  1.16 
     Commerce  -0.020  -0.034  -0.065 -0.068  -0.206 0.027  -0.163  0.033 
  -0.43  -0.48  -2.25  -2.09  -2.76  0.51  -0.30  0.21 
      Real estate  0.094  0.059  0.079  0.058  -0.187 -0.248  -0.736  -0.257
  1.08  0.51  1.69  1.02  -1.31  -3.06  -1.04  -0.66 
      Public services  0.066  0.013  0.094  0.111  0.015  0.068  1.583  0.289 
  1.79  0.25  3.08  3.16  0.10  0.68  1.08  0.42 
      Finance   0.183  0.098  0.286  0.328  -0.062 0.315  -  -0.439
  2.64  1.13  3.59  3.50  -0.27  1.92 -  -0.90 
      Organizations  -0.006  0.009  0.090  -0.012  0.058  -0.167  0.121 0.413 
  -0.17  0.15  3.10  -0.30  0.15  -1.56  0.10  0.60 
       Other  0.045  0.183  -0.015 -0.436  0.391  -0.007  -0.502  0.784  32
  0.30  0.89  -0.14  -2.75  0.86  -0.02  -0.78  2.32 
_m1 7.273  -7.035  18.54  -48.21  0.780  0.833  -27.89  -11.92
          0.93  -0.86  0.37  -1.22  0.12  0.16  -1.40  -0.75 
_m2  -41.02 47.273 -71.60 236.92 -27.98 -8.469 370.76  139.42
  -0.86 0.72 -0.34 1.28 -0.50 -0.26 1.64 0.41 
_m3 118.52  -188.4  141.50 -531.74 143.40 30.64  -1604  -611.4
  0.87 -0.79 0.32 -1.28 0.70 0.33 -1.58  -0.21 
_m4  -158.2 341.6 -138.4 558.01  -286.6 -45.85  2772.3  1039.7
  -0.88  0.86  -0.31  1.25  -0.87  -0.39  1.47  0.10 
_m5 77.15  -222.7  52.78  -221.35 191.18 23.43  -1649  -404.6
  0.86  -0.91  0.30  -1.19  1.00  0.42  -1.38  -0.03 




















2 R   0.28  0.30  0.36  0.31  0.24  0.29  0.11  0.16 
             
Note:  1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage. 
   2. The five categories are: central or provincial state-owned enterprises, local publicly owned enterprises, 
urban collective enterprises (COEs), private or individual enterprises (PIEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). 
   3. The regional dummy variables are omitted in the table. 
          4. The reference categories for the nature of job, the occupation and the economic sector are respectively 
permanent workers, unskilled workers, and industry  
 
Concerning the economic sector of the job, those working in communication in central 
SOEs tend to earn significantly more than those working in industry. Except for women working 
in SOEs at central or provincial level, workers in both central and local SOEs employed in public 
services
20 or finance and insurance are also better paid than those employed in industry. 
Explanation for these results is quite straightforward since these economic sectors are State 
monopolies. On the contrary, workers employed in local SOEs in the sectors of commerce and 
trade, restaurants, etc. earn significantly lower wages than the reference (industry). For private or 
individual enterprises as well as foreign-invested enterprises, wage differences among economic 
sectors are less clear-cut, showing a lower degree of segmentation between economic sectors.  
                                                 
20 The public service sector includes health, physical culture and social welfare; education, culture, arts and 
broadcasting; scientific research and technical services.  33
Finally, concerning the nature of employment, we find usual results with workers in 
SOEs holding a temporary short-term contract earning significantly less than those under a 
permanent contract. However, this finding does not hold for urban collectives, private or 
individual enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. 
 
3. Summary of estimation results  
This section has shown that, even though the depth of the Chinese labour market in 1995 
is still very limited, key explanatory factors can be isolated concerning workers’ choice of 
enterprises ownership. Indeed, education, age and household composition appear to be 
important determinants. Most importantly, we find that education attainment is a key 
determinant for working in SOEs at central and provincial level as well as in foreign-invested 
enterprises.  
Income function estimations provide a first insight on segmentation in the Chinese 
labour market. Indeed, estimation results are significantly different for the five types of 
enterprises studied, with large differences observed for return to education (higher in foreign-
invested enterprises) as well as returns to experience (higher in SOEs and urban collectives). 
These results already show that segmentation is taking place since they predict that identical 
individuals are offered different wages in different types of enterprises.  
Moreover, estimations of augmented wage equations show that segmentation is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon in SOEs and to a lesser extent in urban collectives. Indeed, working in 
different sectors, on different occupations or having different contract lengths leads to different 
wage levels for individuals with identical socio-economic endowments. 
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6.  Decomposition of observed wage differences  
 
Following the methodology presented in section 4, we can now use estimation results 
presented above to decompose wage differentials into what comes from structural socio-
economical differences between workers in the various types of enterprises (characteristics 
effects) and what comes from segmentation on the labour market (segmentation effect). Results 
from this decomposition are given in Table 10 for the whole population of workers (male and 
female) 
21.  
As discussed above, for both men and women, the average hourly wage is the highest in 
foreign-invested enterprises, followed by SOEs at central or provincial level, local publicly-owned 
enterprises, urban collectives and private or individual enterprises. Decomposition results provide 
a direct evaluation of the segmentation taking place on the Chinese labour market between 
enterprises of different ownership structure. Three different types of results are obtained: i) 
observed wage gap is entirely due to segmentation and cannot be imputed to differences in 
individual characteristics of workers; ii) observed wage gap results in the conjunction of 
segmentation and differences in individual characteristics of workers; iii) observed wage gap 
cannot be explained by segmentation. 
Table 10 shows that higher wage in central SOEs compared to local SOEs is entirely due 
to segmentation forces since differences in individual characteristics of workers would even 
predict a (small) gap in favour of local SOEs. The same result holds for the wage gap between 
central SOEs and urban collectives with no significant effect of differences in individual 
characteristics workers. These results highlight the much protected situation of workers in SOEs 
                                                 
21 Tables A2.1 and A2.2, Appendix 2, provide very similar decomposition results by gender.  35
at central or provincial level, which are offered higher wages than workers in other types of 
enterprises. 
 In the same line, lower average wages in private or individual enterprises compared to 
other types of enterprises are entirely due to segmentation, individual characteristics of workers 
in private or individual enterprises being on average of higher standard. However, these results 
should be taken with caution. Indeed, as mentioned above, private or individual enterprises 
include very different economic situations and earning functions estimates for this category 
(upon which simulations are computed) have much higher standard errors.  
Wage gaps between local SOEs, urban collectives and foreign-invested enterprises fall 
into the second category of results. Indeed, Table 10 shows that observed wages gaps for these 
three types of enterprises result from the combination of segmentation phenomena and 
differences in workers’ socio-economic characteristics, with similar orders of magnitude for both 
effects. These results thus show a clear segmentation (explaining at least a quarter of wage 
differentials) in favour of foreign-invested enterprises against both local SOEs and urban 
collectives and in favour of local SOEs against urban collectives. Apart from SOEs at central or 
provincial level, our results thus show that foreign-invested enterprises tend to pay on average 
higher wages than domestic enterprises.  
Lastly, the most surprising result from Table 10 concerns the decomposition of the wage 
gap between foreign-invested enterprises and SOEs at central or provincial level. Indeed, higher 
wages in foreign-invested enterprises compared to SOEs at central or provincial level are entirely 
due to the better characteristics of workers, particularly concerning education attainment. But, 
the strong segmentation in favour of SOEs at central or provincial level against foreign-invested 
enterprises nearly compensates for these better characteristics, lowering the wage gap to nearly  36
zero. This result may be quite surprising since it is very different from usual evaluation of the 
Chinese labour market since foreign-invested enterprises are usually believed to pay higher wages. 
However, as stressed above, two different factors are at stake here: first, higher total annual 
wages in foreign-invested enterprises are obtained at the cost of higher working hours and 
second, foreign-invested enterprises employ on average higher qualified workers.  
We thus find a hierarchical segmentation on the Chinese labour market concerning hourly 
wages. Controlling for differences in workers socio-economic characteristics, SOEs at central or 
provincial level are the highest paying enterprises, before foreign-invested enterprises, and then 
come local SOEs, urban collectives and private or individual enterprises. This ranking mostly 
corresponds to the ranking of observed hourly wages. Segmentation is a key factor (and often the 
only factor) explaining wage gaps between enterprises of different ownership, except for wage 
differences between foreign-invested enterprises and SOEs at central or provincial level for 
which segmentation against foreign-invested enterprises is dominated by higher pays due to an 
average better qualification of workers.   37
Table 10 – Decomposition of the wage differentials
1 
Ownership
2  Average wage    Characteristics  Segmentation 
Base Simulation        Effect  Effect 





CSOEs LSOEs  3.479 3.021 0.457  -0.162  -35%  0.619  135% 
LSOEs CSOEs 3.021 3.479 -0.457  0.141  -31%  -0.598  131% 
CSOEs COEs 3.479 2.433 1.046  -0.041  -4%  1.087  104% 
COEs CSOEs 2.433 3.479  -1.046  -0.058  6%  -0.988  94% 
CSOEs PIEs 3.479  2.091  1.388  -1.288  -93%  2.675  193% 
PIEs CSOEs  2.091  3.479  -1.388  0.524  -38%  -1.912  138% 
CSOEs FIEs 3.479  3.587  -0.108 -0.820  757%  0.712  -657% 
FIEs CSOEs  3.587  3.479  0.108  0.536  494%  -0.427  -394% 
LSOEs COEs 3.021 2.433 0.589  0.196  33%  0.393  67% 
COEs LSOEs 2.433 3.021  -0.589  -0.188  32%  -0.401  68% 
LSOEs PIEs 3.021  2.091  0.930  -0.475  -51%  1.406  151% 
PIEs LSOEs  2.091  3.021  -0.930  0.373  -40%  -1.303  140% 
LSOEs FIEs 3.021  3.587  -0.566 -0.322  57%  -0.243  43% 
FIEs LSOEs  3.587  3.021  0.566  0.425  75%  0.141  25% 
COEs PIEs 2.433  2.091  0.342 -1.055  -309%  1.397  409% 
PIEs COEs  2.091  2.433  -0.342 0.415  -121%  -0.757  221% 
COEs FIEs 2.433  3.587  -1.154 -0.730  63%  -0.424  37% 
FIEs COEs  3.587  2.433  1.154  0.334  29%  0.821  71% 
PIEs FIEs  2.091  3.587  -1.496 0.176  -12%  -1.672  112% 
FIEs PIEs  3.587  2.091  1.496 -0.770  -51%  2.266  151% 
Notes:   1. Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Table 8. 
2. CSOEs refer to SOEs at central or provincial level, LSOEs to local publicly-owned enterprises, COEs to 
urban collective enterprises, PIEs to individual or private enterprises and FIEs to foreign-invested 
enterprises.  
3. Values refer to measured effects evaluated as wage differences in Yuan per hour. 




In this paper, we have analysed the determinants of wage differentials between five 
categories of enterprises (SOEs at central or provincial level, local publicly-owned enterprises, 
urban collective enterprises, private or individual enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises), in 
urban China in 1995. As discussed in the empirical literature on the labour market in China, the 
segmentation issue is crucial here since the dualism that characterises the emerging Chinese 
labour market entails potential sources of growing income inequality among urban workers.   
We find strong evidence for segmentation on the Chinese labour market in 1995, 
segmentation being the major determinant of observed differences in average wages between 
enterprises’ types. In particular, we find that SOEs at central or provincial level offer much 
higher wages than all other types of enterprises, including foreign-invested enterprises. Our 
results actually show a strong segmentation in favour of SOEs at central or provincial level 
against foreign-invested enterprises, average wages in foreign-invested enterprises meeting those 
in SOEs at central or provincial level only because workers in foreign-invested enterprises have 
on average better socio-economic characteristics and in particular a higher education attainment. 
Different interpretations can be given to this last result. First, it could be argued that 
over-protected SOEs at central or provincial level provided above-market wages to their 
employees in 1995. This interpretation falls in the line of discussions on over-employment in 
SOEs and the slow pace at which the non-state sector is absorbing this excess labour. Indeed, 
since SOEs at central or provincial level were providing better payment than any other 
alternatives (not to mention non-monetary advantages, which could not be taken into account 
here), it comes at no surprise that the non-state sector faileds to drive workers out of SOEs.  39
Following this line of analysis, it can be expected that further reforms of the state sector 
undertaken since 1995 would have resulted in decreasing segmentation (market forces playing a 
greater role in wage determination) and increasing incentives for turning to the private sector. 
A second line of interpretation is to analyse sources of hourly wage gap between SOEs at 
central or provincial level and foreign-invested enterprises in the light of broader socio-economic 
dimensions. Indeed, foreign-invested enterprises were offering lower hourly wage to their 
employees in 1995 but could in counterpart offer other non-income advantages. First, as 
discussed in Section 1, foreign-invested enterprises were offering higher total annual wages than 
any other type of enterprises, and we have shown that these higher wages were obtained at the 
cost of higher working hours, which is not possible in SOEs. It is quite likely that most male 
workers in foreign-invested enterprises are attracted by higher total annual wages rather than high 
hourly wages. On the contrary, our results in Section 5 show that women with children or elderly 
living at home would not choose to work in foreign-invested enterprises for this very reason. 
Moreover, foreign-invested enterprises usually offer better working conditions, be it for unskilled 
workers (sanitary and security conditions) or for skilled workers (higher working autonomy). In 
the light of these aspects, the wage gap between SOEs at central or provincial level and foreign-
invested enterprises in 1995 can be partly explained as a working condition premium. 
The temporal issue also needs to be addressed here. Indeed, in 1995, SOEs in China were 
starting to give alarming weaknesses
22 whereas foreign-invested enterprises were experiencing 
rapid growth. Choosing foreign-invested enterprises against SOEs can thus be considered as a 
middle-term investment. Indeed, even if leaving the state sector was risky and costly in terms of 
hourly wage as well as non-wage benefits such as housing or health care, it could be considered as 
                                                 
22 According to the Third National Industrial Census of the PRC, in 1995 34% of SOEs were loss-making.   40
insurance against the collapse of the state sector. This would here correspond to a negative 
premium against SOEs due to middle-term uncertainty about the viability of a large number of 
SOEs. 
Moreover, the choice of working in a specific type of enterprise is an individual as well as 
a household decision. In this work, we also found some signs of risk diversification behaviours at 
the household level, some household member taking to foreign-invested enterprises or private or 
individual enterprises while others stay in SOEs. 
Lastly, as mentioned above, the empirical analysis provided in this paper suffers from a 
main drawback coming from the fact that it relies on only one specific year (1995). It is thus 
difficult to draw inferences for the most recent period since the labour market conditions have 
changed dramatically over the last decade, especially since the SOEs reforms were launched from 
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Appendix 1 – Wage equation estimations for PIEs and FIEs with gender interaction 
variables 
  Dahl 
  PIEs FIEs 
    
Education    
      Man  0.076 0.100 
  1.04 3.58 
      Woman  0.110 0.071 
  1.55 2.63 
Experience    
       Man  0.048 0.009 
         0.49 0.30 
       Woman  0.014 0.063 
  0.17 1.93 
Experience
2    
        Man  -0.000 0.000 
  -0.07 0.27 
        Woman  -0.000 -0.001 
  -0.05 -0.97 
Communist  1.003 0.026 
  1.11 0.11 
Coast  0.765 0.348 
  2.63 2  .42 
Observations  107 144 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.08 0.14 
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Appendix 2 – Decomposition results by gender 
 
Table A2.1 – Decomposition of the wage differentials for women 
Ownership Average  wage    Characteristics  Segmentation 
Base Simulation        Effect  Effect 
(A) (B)  YA  YB Y A - YB Value  %  Value % 
CPSOEs  LSOEs 3.247 2.824  0.422  -0.199  -47%  0.621  147%
LSOEs CPSOEs 2.824  3.247  -0.422  0.128 -30%  -0.551  130%
CPSOEs COEs  3.247  2.26  0.979  -0.051 -5%  1.031  105%
COEs CPSOEs  2.267 3.247  -0.979  0.047 -5%  -1.027  105%
CPSOEs PIEs  3.247 1.716  1.531 -1.382  -90%  2.913  190%
PIEs CPSOEs  1.716 3.247 -1.531 0.474  -31%  -2.005  131%
CPSOEs FIEs  3.247 3.344 -0.097 -1.049  1078%  A0.952  -978%
FIEs CPSOEs  3.344 3.247  0.097  0.534  548%  -0.436  -448%
LSOEs COEs 2.824  2.267 0.557  0.197  35%  0.359  65% 
COEs  LSOEs 2.267 2.824  -0.557 -0.095  17%  -0.462  83% 
LSOEs PIEs 2.824  1.716 1.109  -0.297  -27%  1.405  127%
PIEs  LSOEs 1.716 2.824  -1.109  0.353  -32%  -1.461  132%
LSOEs FIEs 2.824  3.344  -0.520  -0.167  32%  -0.353  68% 
FIEs  LSOEs 3.344 2.824  0.520  0.419 81%  0.101  19% 
COEs PIEs  2.267  1.716  0.552  -1.046  -190%  1.598  290%
PIEs COEs  1.716  2.267  -0.552  0.257  -47%  -0.809  147%
COEs FIEs  2.267  3.344  -1.076  -0.856  80%  -0.220  20% 
FIEs COEs  3.344  2.267  1.076  0.298  28%  0.779  72% 
PIEs FIEs  1.716  3.344  -1.628  0.036  -2%  -1.665  102%
FIEs PIEs  3.344  1.716  1.628  -0.525  -32%  2.153  132%
Notes:   See Table 10. 
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Table A2.2 – Decomposition of the wage differentials for men 
Ownership Average  wage   Characteristics  Segmentation 
Base Simulation        Effect  Effect 
(A) (B)  YA Y B Y A - YB Value  %  Value  % 
CPSOEs LSOEs  3.633  3.194  0.439  -0.178 -41%  0.618  141%
LSOEs CPSOEs  3.194  3.633  -0.439  0.191  -43%  -0.630  143%
CPSOEs COEs  3.633  2.691  0.942  -0.233 -25%  1.175  125%
COEs CPSOEs  2.691  3.633  -0.942  0.020  -2%  -0.963  102%
CPSOEs PIEs  3.633  2.562  1.071  -1.306  -122%  2.377  222%
PIEs CPSOEs  2.562  3.633 -1.071  0.779 -73%  -1.850  173%
CPSOEs FIEs  3.633  3.794 -0.161 -0.668  414%  0.507  -314%
FIEs CPSOEs  3.794  3.633  0.161  0.582  361%  -0.421  -261%
LSOEs COEs  3.194  2.691  0.503  0.058 12%  0.444  88%
COEs LSOEs  2.691  3.194 -0.503 -0.156  31%  -0.347  69%
LSOEs PIEs  3.194 2.562 0.631 -0.775  -123%  1.406  223%
PIEs LSOEs  2.562 3.194 -0.631 0.534  -85%  -1.165  185%
LSOEs FIEs  3.194 3.794 -0.601  -0.451  75%  -0.150  25%
FIEs LSOEs  3.794 3.194 0.601 0.425  71%  0.176  29%
COEs PIEs  2.691 2.562  0.129  -1.015  -789%  1.143  889%
PIEs COEs  2.562 2.691  -0.129  0.547  -425%  -0.676  525%
COEs FIEs  2.691 3.794  -1.104  -0.506  46%  -0.598  54%
FIEs COEs  3.794 2.691  1.104 0.218  20%  0.886  80%
PIEs FIEs  2.562  3.794  -1.232  0.447  -36%  -1.679  136%
FIEs PIEs  3.794  2.562  1.232  -1.175  -95%  2.408  195%
Notes:   See Table 10. 
 